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Magnifying Deterrence by Prosecuting Professionals 
SCOTT A. SCHUMACHER* 
This Article examines the recent series of criminal prosecutions against tax 
professionals and offshore bankers. These criminal cases, brought against the 
largest Swiss bank (UBS), the oldest Swiss bank (Wegelin), one of the largest 
accounting firms in the world (KPMG), as well as numerous lawyers and 
accountants, represent a dramatic shift for the U.S. Department of Justice. After 
decades of tolerating abusive tax shelters and tax haven banks, the government 
changed its policy. However, rather than indicting the individuals and corporations 
who invested in tax shelters or hid money in offshore accounts, the Justice 
Department indicted the lawyers, accountants, and bankers who advised them. This 
Article will analyze those prosecutions from a theoretical, historical, and practical 
perspective, and will examine the impact the new prosecution policy will have on 
the legal professional, the tax system, and international relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past few years have seen a dramatic shift in the prosecution policies of the 
U.S. Department of Justice in tax cases. Until recently, the U.S. government rarely 
prosecuted cases that involved the gray areas of the law, and arguable, if not 
plausible, interpretations of the Tax Code were rarely the subject of prosecutions.1 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Director Graduate Program in Taxation, University of 
Washington School of Law, Seattle. The author would like to thank Professors Steve 
Johnson, Kathryn Watts, and Sam Donaldson for their helpful insights, suggestions, and 
encouragement, John Clynch, and Rika Valdman for their research assistance and useful 
edits, and the library staff of the University of Washington School of Law’s Gallagher Law 
Library for their invaluable research assistance. 
 1. Cf. United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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Indictments of attorneys and accountants were even rarer, and these prosecutions 
usually accompanied the indictment of the taxpayers themselves.2 As a result, the 
government generally resorted to bringing civil tax cases when going after 
investors in abusive tax shelters, and the professionals who marketed these scams 
were rarely brought into even these civil proceedings.3 Likewise, the use of 
offshore accounts by U.S. taxpayers was tolerated by prosecutors for decades.4 
Indeed, the tax treaty with Switzerland acknowledged Swiss bank secrecy in tax 
prosecutions.5 This indulgence of tax shelters and tax havens led, at least in part, to 
their proliferation.6 
However, beginning with the tax shelter prosecutions in 2005,7 the 
government’s policy of restraint has undergone a significant change. Rather than 
challenging abusive transactions civilly or prosecuting the taxpayers, the 
government began focusing its criminal resources on the professionals who advised 
and enabled their clients to evade or avoid taxes. Thus, instead of pursuing 
taxpayers who claimed hundreds of millions of dollars in phony losses, the 
government decided to go after the accounting firms, law firms, and professionals 
who advised these taxpayers.8 And these were not just any firms. The government 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Mastropieri, 685 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 3. See, e.g., Gray v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1306, 1323 (1987) (“IME Gold for Tax Dollars” 
shelter held to be a fraudulent factual sham; negligence penalties sustained against shelter 
investors); Glass v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1087, 1177 (1986) (commodities straddles were 
“sham[s] in substance”). 
 4. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN AID, DEATH AND TAXES: THE TRUE TOLL OF TAX DODGING 20–
21 (2008) [hereinafter CHRISTIAN AID], available at http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images
/deathandtaxes.pdf; 1 WALTER H. DIAMOND & DOROTHY B. DIAMOND, TAX HAVENS OF THE 
WORLD, at Intro. 18 (2013). 
 5. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on 
Income, U.S.-Switz., art. 26, Oct. 2, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 112-1 (limiting exchanges of 
information in tax investigations to the “prevention of tax fraud or the like”). Under Swiss 
law, “tax fraud” is a much more limited concept than under U.S. law, and does not include 
tax evasion and most violations of U.S. tax laws. Rolf H. Weber, Swiss Banking Secrecy in 
Evolution, 18 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 317, 337 (2003). 
 6. See infra notes 114–58 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. N.Y., to Robert S. 
Bennett 2 (Aug. 26, 2005) [hereinafter KPMG DPA] (transmitting the KPMG Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05
/kpmgdpagmt.pdf. It may be argued that a deferred prosecution agreement is not really a 
“prosecution.” See, e.g., Editorial, Too Big to Indict?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at A38, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/opinion/hsbc-too-big-to-indict.html?_r=0. 
In many respects, a deferred prosecution agreement has all the hallmarks of a criminal 
prosecution, at least with respect to entities that cannot be jailed. KPMG, HSBC, and others 
entering into a deferred prosecution agreement have publicly admitted to conduct that 
violated the law, and they paid large monetary sanctions. Yet, these entities did not plead 
guilty to a crime. Thus, to the extent that a criminal conviction still carries a stigma, these 
entities have not been subject to the full force of the criminal law. I will reserve a full 
discussion on the question of whether a deferred prosecution is truly a criminal prosecution. 
For purposes of this Article, I will assume that it is. 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Daugerdas, 757 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); United 
States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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proceeded criminally against professionals from some of the leading law and 
accounting firms, including KPMG, Ernst & Young, Brown & Wood, and Jenkens 
& Gilchrist.9 These cases garnered mixed results for the government, with the 
government getting some notable victories,10 but also some high-profile losses.11 In 
the process, however, the government effectively shut down the tax shelter industry 
and fundamentally changed tax practice.12 
The government persisted in this policy of pursuing professionals when it 
decided to go after Swiss banks and bankers, instead of the tens of thousands of 
U.S. depositors who hid money in undeclared offshore accounts. As with the tax 
shelter cases, the government targeted some of the biggest players, entering into a 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement with UBS, Switzerland’s largest bank, and 
indicting some of its bankers.13 In 2012, the government indicted Switzerland’s 
oldest bank, Wegelin Bank, and three of its partners, even though the bank had no 
U.S. office.14 As a result of the indictment, the bank essentially ceased to exist as 
an independent entity within a month.15 Wegelin pleaded guilty to tax crimes in 
January 2013, and formally ceased operation.16 While the prosecution of banks and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2012); Daugerdas, 757 F. 
Supp. 2d 364; Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330. 
 10. See, e.g., Christie Smythe & Bob Van Voris, Former Lawyer Daugerdas Convicted 
in Tax-Fraud Scheme Retrial, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-10-31/ex-lawyer-daugerdas-convicted-in-tax-
fraud-scheme-retrial-1. 
 11. See, e.g., Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330. The Stein loss was the result of prosecutorial 
overreaching and not the underlying substance of accusations in the indictment. See United 
States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 157 (2d Cir. 2008). Indeed, three of the codefendants in Stein 
were convicted. See Lynnley Browning, 3 Convicted in KPMG Tax Shelter Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at B11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/business
/18kpmg.html. 
 12. Tax practice was also affected by changes in the ethical rules applicable to rendering 
tax advice. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2011). 
 13. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, U.S. Indicts Two in Switzerland on Tax Charges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, at B1; Lynnley Browning, A Swiss Bank Is Set to Open Its Secret 
Files, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19
/business/worldbusiness/19ubs.html; see also Indictment, United States v. Little, No 1:12-
mj-01241 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2012) (British attorney indicted for assisting U.S. taxpayers to 
hide funds in Swiss and other foreign bank accounts); David Voreacos, Offshore Tax 
Scorecard: UBS, Credit Suisse, HSBC, Julius Baer, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 12, 
2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-12/offshore-tax-scorecard-ubs-credit
-suisse-hsbc-julius-baer.html. 
 14. David Voreacos, Swiss Bank Wegelin Charged in U.S. with Aiding Tax Evasion, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-03
/swiss-bank-wegelin-charged-in-u-dot-s-dot-with-aiding-tax-evasion; Christoph Eisenring, 
Die Checkliste der US-Justiz, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.nzz.ch
/aktuell/wirtschaft/uebersicht/die-checkliste-der-us-justiz-1.14406167. 
 15. Haig Simonian, Wegelin Becomes Victim of US Tax Dispute, FIN. TIMES (Jan 27, 
2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/864c58ca-48fc-11e1-88f0-00144feabdc0.html#axzz
21ZLScv2B. 
 16. Rupert Neate, Oldest Swiss Bank to Close After US Tax Evasion Scam, GUARDIAN, 
Jan. 5, 2013, at 32, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/04/swiss-bank
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bankers was ongoing, the government allowed most U.S. taxpayers to resolve their 
cases civilly via a series of offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives.17 These 
combined actions, along with the actions of other countries, dramatically changed 
offshore banking and the use and perception of tax havens.18 
In this Article, I will examine the government’s decision to pursue the 
professionals, instead of the clients the professionals represented, and the impact 
this revised prosecution policy has had on the tax system.19 In so doing, I will 
examine these prosecutions in their historical context, analyze whether they 
represent sound policy, and recommend whether changes in the policy should be 
made. 
In Part I of the Article, I will examine the history of criminal prosecutions in 
both the tax shelter and tax haven areas. This history demonstrates that very few 
people, whether taxpayer or professional, were charged criminally for investing in 
tax shelters or hiding money in tax havens. This tolerance by prosecutors led to 
their continued use and expansion. Part II will then discuss the recent criminal 
prosecutions brought against tax lawyers, accountants, and bankers for their role in 
assisting their clients and customers in evading taxes. These cases will provide the 
necessary backdrop for what appears to be a fundamental shift in prosecution 
policy. 
Part III of the Article will analyze the theory underlying criminal prosecutions. 
In this Part, I will show that federal prosecutors enjoy wide discretion as to whom 
to charge. Given this discretion, it is essential that front-line prosecutors are guided 
by clear prosecution policies and that those policies be consistently followed. These 
policies, while not crystalline, require prosecutors to determine the culpability of 
the person charged, including the person’s relative culpability in relation to other 
actors not charged; the deterrent effect (particularly general deterrence) that would 
result from the prosecution; the retributive effect of the prosecution, in particular 
whether the victim of the crime has been compensated and their injuries have been 
addressed; and whether the prosecution will serve to protect the integrity of the 
civil tax system. 
Finally, in Part IV, I will examine whether the recent prosecutions are consistent 
with the criminal theory and the government’s prosecution goals discussed in Part 
III. I will argue that both the tax shelter and tax haven cases were generally 
consistent with criminal theory and the goals of prosecution policies and have for 
the most part been very successful. The most successful, indeed ingenious, aspect 
of the policy, whether intended or not, comes from the leveraging of general 
deterrence. By prosecuting professionals, rather than the taxpayers, the government 
has magnified the deterrent effect of the prosecutions. In so doing, the revised 
prosecution policies have fundamentally changed tax compliance. 
                                                                                                                 
-wegelin-close-tax-evasion. 
 17. See, e.g., IRS Notice 2011-54, 2011-29 I.R.B. 53; IRS Notice 2010-23, 2010-11 
I.R.B. 441. 
 18. Thomas Zehnle & George Clarke, When the Wall Comes Crumbling Down: What to 
Do with Taxpayers Who Cannot or Will Not Voluntarily Disclose, 7 WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
REP. (BNA), Jan. 13, 2013, at 33. 
 19. It should be noted that the government’s decision to go after professionals is not 
limited to tax prosecutions. See, e.g., Scott A. Schumacher, Stevens: Is Zealous Advocacy 
Obstruction of Justice?, 132 TAX NOTES 1169 (2011). 
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That being said, the new prosecution policy is not beyond criticism. The tax 
professionals who marketed the tax shelters created and sold these shelters to their 
clients as a prepackaged transaction at a handsome profit. Thus, without the 
professionals, no taxpayer would have invested in these shelters, and they have at 
least a colorable claim of relying on their professional advisor. By contrast, the tax 
haven banks are no more culpable (and arguably less culpable) than many of the 
U.S. taxpayers who hid money in those accounts, and who escaped prosecution. 
More significantly, while the tax haven prosecutions address the losses suffered by 
U.S. taxpayers, little has been done for the true victims of tax haven abuse—the 
developing world. I will provide a brief review of the devastating impact of tax 
havens on the developing world. Thus, while prosecuting bankers may make sense 
from a pragmatic standpoint, more must be done to protect the integrity of the tax 
system and to ensure that the injuries of the true victims of this conduct are 
redressed. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF TAX PROSECUTIONS 
A. Tax Shelters 
The concept of minimizing one’s taxes has existed for centuries, and tax shelters 
are nothing new.20 Indeed, the 1970s saw a proliferation of shelters, which were 
invested in by thousands of taxpayers.21 These shelters were generally dealt with in 
civil cases and were ultimately shut down by legislative changes.22 Significantly, 
many of these shelters involved mostly, if not completely, fictitious transactions.23 
Taxpayers “invested” in mines with no ore,24 cattle that did not roam,25 and 
videotapes that did not play.26 In the words of Gertrude Stein, “there is no there 
there.”27 And the losses in these cases were not insignificant. Indeed, the estimated 
current revenue loss from these shelters was not appreciably less than the more 
recent generations of shelters.28 However, despite the utterly fictitious nature of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. See, e.g., Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes, and Abusive Transactions: Why 
Today’s Thoughtful U.S. Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to “Just Say No,” in 3 MPI 
Studies on Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law 289, 289 (2008) (recounting tax 
dodges throughout history since the times of Ancient Rome). 
 21. See, e.g., Glass v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986) (consolidating more than 1000 cases). 
 22. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 465, 469 (2012). 
 23. See, e.g., Goldberg v. United States, 789 F.2d 1341, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(describing “Margolis transactions” typical of shelters peddled by Harry Margolis, which 
were characterized by convoluted transfers of overvalued property rights, circular money 
movements among foreign trusts, delayed drafting, signing and backdating of documents, 
and client obliviousness to the financial realities of their investments). 
 24. Bouskos v. Comm’r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117 (1987). 
 25. Durham Farms # 1, J.V. v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2009, aff’d, 59 F. App’x 952 
(9th Cir. 2003). 
 26. Magin v. Comm’r, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 208 (1985). 
 27. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (photo. reprint 1971) (1937). 
 28. The IRS estimates a revenue loss of $3.6 billion in 1983. Ann Southworth, 
Redefining the Attorney’s Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37 STAN. L. REV. 889, 889 n.4 
(1985) (citing Randall Smith & Kenneth H. Bacon, Building Trouble?: Boom in Tax Shelters 
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these transactions, very few people were prosecuted. One of the few people to be 
indicted was Harry Margolis, perhaps the most infamous tax lawyer who marketed 
tax shelters in the 1970s.29 The government brought two separate prosecutions 
against Margolis and failed to obtain a conviction in either case. This would 
understandably have made the government a little gun-shy in prosecuting future 
cases. The government also lost other high profile criminal tax cases that involved 
arguable questions of law.30 
The result was that cases where a plausible argument could be made were 
essentially immune from prosecution.31 This system, along with the government’s 
general tolerance of tax shelters (at least from a criminal perspective),32 led to a 
belief that even the hokiest of schemes would not be prosecuted, as long as it had at 
least a patina of legitimacy.33 Moreover, the thicker the patina the better. 
Disguising what essentially was a made-up series of predetermined transactions in 
a blizzard of paperwork made the transaction at least appear to be legitimate. It also 
had the perverse effect of making these shelters more difficult to detect.34 Not only 
did these transactions greatly benefit the clients, they were also incredibly lucrative 
for the firms who promoted them.35 
Moreover, shelters thrived under a system that imposed little downside to either 
the client or the professional advising the client. Taxpayers are not subject to 
penalties if they can show they acted with reasonable cause in good faith.36 
Reliance on the advice of a professional generally constitutes reasonable cause and 
good faith.37 If a lawyer or accountant advises a taxpayer that a position has a 
more-likely-than-not chance of success, then, at least as to that taxpayer and that 
tax position, the position does meet that standard, since taxpayers are generally 
allowed to rely on the advice of tax experts.38 Thus, the low audit rate, complex and 
                                                                                                                 
Artificially Lifts Prices of Much Real Estate, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 1). In 2007 
dollars, that amount is $7.6 billion. The IRS estimated $10 billion in losses from the recent 
iteration of shelters. Mary Williams Walsh, Treasury Department Cracks Down on Tax 
Shelters for Firms, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at C-1. 
 29. See Goldberg, 789 F.2d 1341. 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1131 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that 
criminal prosecutions “must rest on a violation of a clear rule of law”); United States v. 
Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1985) (overturning a conviction that was based on a vague 
point of law). 
 31. Cf. Harris, 942 F.2d. at 1134–35 (discussing evidence presented at trial that may 
have supported convictions for various other crimes that were never charged). 
 32. These shelters were certainly not tolerated altogether. The IRS and Department of 
Justice engaged in a vigorous civil campaign against these shelters. See, e.g., Glass v. 
Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986). 
 33. Indeed, it was believed that these schemes would not be subject even to civil 
penalties. Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter 
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 93–94 (2006). 
 34. Scott A. Schumacher, MacNiven v. Westmoreland and Tax Advice: Using 
“Purposive Textualism” to Deal with Tax Shelters and Promote Legitimate Tax Advice, 92 
MARQ. L. REV. 33, 90 (2008). 
 35. See Rostain, supra note 33, at 93–94. 
 36. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4 (2012). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Schumacher, supra note 34, at 62. 
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nearly impenetrable transactions, and high-net-worth individuals willing to take a 
chance on these transactions created a dangerous cocktail indeed. 
B. Tax Havens 
Tax havens,39 or global financial centers, as they are sometimes called, have 
existed since at least the 1930s.40 Modern tax havens have their origins in 
Switzerland and that country’s bank secrecy laws.41 Privacy in banking and 
financial matters is part of Switzerland’s historic tradition of protecting all secrets 
and a general commitment to the preservation and protection of the individual’s 
right of privacy.42 Swiss bank secrecy laws date from the 1930s and were designed, 
at least initially, to protect individuals, particularly those in Nazi Germany, from 
having their accounts seized.43 When the Swiss Banking Act was enacted in 1934, 
foreign nations, and not just Nazi Germany, were attempting to confiscate Jewish 
property. Agents were sent into Switzerland to find bank accounts of Jews and 
other dissidents. Thus, Swiss banking secrecy laws must be understood in their 
historical context.  
Bank secrecy is enshrined in Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act44 and Article 
273 of the Swiss Penal Code.45 Under these laws, Swiss bankers must protect their 
customer’s name, the type of bank account, the transactions the client entered into, 
and any information supplied by the customer in connection with the account.46 
Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code makes it a crime for a person to divulge secret 
business information to a foreign government authority or its agents.47 In addition 
to criminal sanctions, violating confidentiality mandates could also result in civil 
liability and administrative sanctions, including revocation of a bank’s license or 
suspension of a bank executive convicted of a secrecy violation.48 The availability 
of private and secure banking caused many of the world’s wealthy to put their 
money in Swiss banks. This influx of capital was a boon to Switzerland’s economy. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. There is no one accepted definition of what constitutes a tax haven, nor is there an 
agreed upon list of the countries that should be considered tax havens. See, e.g., U. S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-157, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: LARGE U.S. 
CORPORATIONS AND FEDERAL CONTRACTORS WITH SUBSIDIARIES IN JURISDICTIONS LISTED AS 
TAX HAVENS OR FINANCIAL PRIVACY JURISDICTIONS 9–17 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 40. See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and International 
Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 325, 328 (1998). 
 41. Id. at 328–30. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Lutz Krauskopf, Regents’ Lectures: Comments on Switzerland’s Insider Trading, 
Money Laundering, and Banking Secrecy Laws, 9 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 277, 293 (1991). 
 44. Bundesgesetz [BankG] [Banking Statute] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952.0, art. 47 (Switz.) 
[hereinafter Banking Statute], unofficial translation available at http://www.kpmg.com/CH
/de/Library/Legislative-Texts/Documents/pub_20090101-BankA.pdf. 
 45. SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, art. 
273 (Switz.) [hereinafter SWISS PENAL CODE], reprinted in Krauskopf, supra note 43, at 295. 
 46. Banking Statute art. 47(a). 
 47. SWISS PENAL CODE, supra note 45, at art. 273. 
 48. See Krauskopf, supra note 43, at 296–97.The conduct of UBS and its bankers must 
be viewed in light of this very stringent requirement. 
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The success of the Swiss banking industry caused other countries around the 
world to look at banking and financial services as a possible industry. 
Liechtenstein, for example, saw its neighbor and close ally as a big brother to be 
emulated. By enacting a combination of strict bank secrecy laws, flexible and 
nuanced entity structures, and low taxes, Liechtenstein transformed itself from a 
poor agricultural country into a prosperous, highly industrialized economy with a 
thriving financial service industry.49 The United Kingdom also saw the benefit of 
low taxes and bank secrecy in attracting capital, which it desperately needed in the 
decades following World War II. It used its Crown Dependencies, like the Cayman 
Islands, British Virgin Islands, and Bermuda to attract this capital.50 It is no 
accident that many tax havens are current or former British colonies or 
dependencies.51 In the following decades, tax havens sprang up around the world, 
from Panama to Iceland, Singapore to Monaco—all offering financial security and 
privacy. 
While the label of tax haven is often considered something to be avoided, 
especially recently,52 countries who offered these services usually attained greater 
financial success. The per capita GDP of haven countries greatly exceeds those of 
nonhaven countries.53 Liechtenstein has the second highest per capita income in the 
world, after Monaco (another tax haven).54 The Cayman Islands, which prior to its 
status as a tax haven was poor with few natural resources, now has one of the 
highest standards of living in the Caribbean.55 The benefits of being a tax haven 
must be fully appreciated if serious reforms are to take place. Wealthy nations rich 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. 2 DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 4, at Liech. 4. 
 50. The UK Crown Dependencies continue to make a significant contribution to the UK 
financial markets and the British banking system. MICHAEL FOOT, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF BRITISH OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTRES 6 (2009), available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/foot_review
_main.pdf. 
 51. See Dhammika Dharmapala, What Problems and Opportunities Are Created by Tax 
Havens?, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 661, 671 n.24 (2008); Richard A. Johnson, Why 
Harmful Tax Practices Will Continue After Developing Nations Pay: A Critique of the OECD’s 
Initiatives Against Harmful Tax Competition, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 351, 359 (2006). 
 52. See Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty 
Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 678 (2012). Being labeled a “tax haven” can earn a country 
a spot on the OECD’s “black list,” with the concomitant threat of sanctions. See, e.g., Martin 
A. Sullivan, Lessons From the Last War on Tax Havens, TAX NOTES, Jul. 30, 2007, at 327. 
In addition, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) imposes a strict 
withholding regime on distributions from the U.S. to foreign financial institutions that have 
not entered into a tax reporting agreement with the Internal Revenue Service. FATCA, Pub. 
L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71, 97 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–1474). 
 53. Dharmapala, supra note 51, at 664. 
 54. Leigh Baldwin & Carolyn Bandel, Liechtenstein Monarch Will Keep Veto Powers 
After Referendum, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 1, 2012, 8:06 AM), http://www
.businessweek.com/news/2012-07-01/liechtenstein-monarch-will-keep-veto-powers-after-
referendum. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 13–14 (showing both Liechtenstein 
and Monaco as jurisdictions identified as tax havens). 
 55. 1 DIAMOND & DIAMOND, supra note 4, at Cayman Is. 3. 
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in natural resources cannot seriously believe that small countries with no natural 
resources would willingly give up their primary source of revenue.56 
More recently, other countries have seen the benefits of providing financial 
services to the world’s wealthy. The Netherlands have gained international 
notoriety for trusts holding the wealth of rock stars like the Rolling Stones and U2, 
so that these and other multimillionaires do not have to pay U.K. taxes on their 
royalties.57 The combination of treaties and tax laws of Ireland and the Netherlands 
has caused many international corporations to structure their transactions in what 
has become known as the rather yummy-sounding name of the “Double Irish with a 
Dutch Sandwich.”58 Denmark has become the country of choice to set up a 
corporation that owns other corporations, thereby facilitating tax avoidance.59 Even 
the Vatican’s bank, the Institute for Works of Religion (Istituto per le Opere di 
Religione in Italian), holds billions of dollars of deposits all with strict bank 
secrecy.60 Finally, depending upon how one defines the term “tax haven,” several 
U.S. states, including Nevada, Wyoming, and Delaware, have been labeled tax 
havens.61 
Of course, there has not been a universal acceptance of tax havens. Concerns 
about money laundering and terrorism financing triggered many jurisdictions to 
require banks to “know [their] customer[s]” in an effort to stop the illicit flow of 
money.62 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
maintains a “black list” and a “gray list” that purport to show the level of 
cooperation by tax haven countries.63 Various governments have set up task forces 
to deal with the problems of tax havens.64 However, no one could be so naïve as to 
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think that the wealthy were not still hiding money offshore. Everyone knew it, but 
they lacked the will, the ability, or the interest to stop it. 
Indeed, as with tax shelters, the government brought few criminal tax 
prosecutions for the use of tax havens,65 and even those few prosecutions did not 
always result in conviction.66 Prosecutors did not pursue the offshore banks 
themselves. Instead, they sought merely to obtain information from the banks about 
U.S. depositors,67 and even those efforts produced a backlash.68 
II. A SEA CHANGE 
A. The Tax Shelter War 
With a new century, the government’s treatment of both tax shelters and tax 
havens began to change. On a broader scale, the Justice Department beefed up its 
“Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” in January 2003 by 
then-Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, in what is known as the 
Thompson Memorandum.69 This amplified policy showed that the government 
would take a harder line against corporate crime.70 The government backed up this 
tough talk with its indictment of Arthur Andersen.71 This “get tough” approach was 
also employed in tax cases, with the government going after tax shelters in both 
civil and criminal cases.72 
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In Notice 2000-44, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) stated that certain 
shelters were considered abusive,73 and that investors in these shelters might be 
subject to criminal prosecution.74 Although similar to the generations of shelters, 
the breed of tax shelters listed in Notice 2000-44 and other IRS notices differed in 
size and scope from shelters from the 1970s. While the typical 1970s shelter 
involved tax savings in the thousands of dollars, the new shelters saved the 
taxpayers millions of dollars.75 However, like the shelters of old, the newer shelters 
involved taking the tax code provision out of context and inventing facts. 
One of the most notorious—and lucrative—of these shelters was the Son of 
BOSS shelter.76 While known by many names77 and with different variations, these 
shelters had essentially the same fundamentals. The taxpayer would enter into a 
short-sale transaction, which had the corresponding obligation to close the 
transaction at later date. The initial short sale would produce a large amount of 
cash, which, along with other cash or property, was transferred into a partnership.78 
The taxpayer would increase their basis in the partnership by the value of the cash 
and other property contributed, but the taxpayer would not reduce his basis by the 
obligation to close the short sale, citing a strained reading of § 752.79 The 
partnership would then close the short sale, thereby reducing the amount of cash in 
the partnership. Shortly thereafter, the taxpayer would sell his interest in the 
partnership for a price equal to the cash and property remaining in the partnership. 
This transaction would generate a loss equal to the difference between the amount 
realized over the adjusted basis unreduced by the obligation, generating losses in 
some cases in excess of $100 million.80 
These shelters had no business purpose and were entered into solely to generate 
tax losses. Like the “Margolis transactions,” these transactions were prewired and 
                                                                                                                 
registration and investor list requirements; (3) obtained investor lists from at least twenty-
five promoters; (4) identified twenty-seven abusive tax shelters through formal notices; and 
(5) audited taxpayers to determine whether they invested in abusive transactions. IRS Sues to 
Enforce Promoter Summonses, Get Investor Names from Jenkens & Gilchrist, 22 TAX 
MGMT. WEEKLY. REPORT (BNA), Aug. 18, 2003, at 1326. 
 73. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255. 
 74. Id. at 256; see also I.R.S. Notice 2000-61, 2000-2 C.B. 569; I.R.S. Notice 2002-50, 
2002-2 C.B. 98. 
 75. For example, several KPMG clients claimed fraudulent losses in excess of $100 
million. See Superseding Indictment at 64–66, United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), No. S1 05 Cr. 888 (LAK), available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages
/pdf/business/20051018_kpmgletter.pdf. 
 76. The Son of BOSS tax shelter is a derivation of the BOSS (Bond Option and Sales 
Strategy). Kligfeld Holdings v. Comm’r, 128 T.C. 192, 194 (2007). 
 77. These shelters were known by other proprietary names like COBRA, BLIPS and 
SOS. Leandra Lederman, A Tisket, a Tasket: Basketing and Corporate Tax Shelters, 88 
WASH. U. L. REV. 557, 590 n.222 (2011) (citing Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, 
COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax Shelter, 62 TAX LAW 59, 62, 64 n.20 (2008)). 
 78. Kligfeld Holdings, 128 T.C. at 194–95. 
 79. Id. at 195–96; see also 26 U.S.C. § 752(b) (“Any decrease in a partner’s share of the 
liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner’s individual liabilities by reason of 
the assumption by the partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be considered as a 
distribution of money to the partner by the partnership.”). 
 80. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, supra note 73; Superseding Indictment, supra note 75, at 64–66. 
522 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:511 
 
predetermined.81 The promoters drafted all of the documents and executed all of the 
transactions.82 They created false factual recitations setting forth the taxpayer’s 
alleged business purpose in entering into the transactions and presented them to the 
client for signature.83 This false factual recitation then became the factual basis for 
the opinion letter drafted by the promoter.84 An associate (or co-conspirator, if you 
will) would then prepare a tax return based on the phony opinion letter drafted by 
the promoter, which was based on the bogus statement of facts, also drafted by the 
promoter.85 
While the prior tax shelter industry involved professionals who were mostly 
outliers,86 the advisors involved in the more recent shelters worked for some of the 
most prestigious accounting and law firms.87 The fees earned by these professionals 
were equally impressive. KPMG earned $53 million from just one tax shelter it 
sold to 186 individuals.88 BDO Seidman, through its tax products group known as 
the “wolf pack,” admitted to receiving $100 million from its tax shelter sales.89 
Banks like Deutsche Bank, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch also got into the act,90 
as did law firms like Jenkens & Gilchrist and Brown & Wood.91 Jenkens & 
Gilchrist attorney Paul Daugerdas made more than $95 million from marketing 
shelters from 1998 through 2002.92 
Faced with incredible tax losses, the egregious nature of the transactions, 
combined with a determination to do something about tax shelters, the government 
abandoned its long-standing tolerance of shelters. In 2005, the international accounting 
firm KPMG escaped indictment only by entering into a deferred prosecution 
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agreement and agreeing to pay a $456 million fine.93 In so doing, it admitted that from 
1996 through 2002, it assisted high-net-worth individuals evade income taxes on 
billions of dollars of income by developing, promoting, and implementing fraudulent 
tax shelters.94 KPMG also admitted that a number of its partners engaged in unlawful 
and fraudulent conduct, including preparing false tax returns, drafting false factual 
recitations and representations as part of the documentation supporting the shelters, 
and issuing opinions that contained these false statements and concealed the true 
nature of the shelters from the IRS.95 KPMG also agreed to shut down its individual, 
compensation, and benefits tax practices, and employ heightened opinion standards 
when rendering tax opinions.96 Deutsche Bank, Germany’s largest bank, agreed to pay 
a fine of $554 million for its role in helping KPMG implement these tax shelters.97 
In 2007, Jenkens & Gilchrist, a Dallas-based law firm, whose Chicago office was 
one of the hotbeds of tax shelter promotion, entered into a non-prosecution agreement. 
Under this agreement, Jenkens agreed to pay a $76 million penalty and to shut down 
its practice. The firm no longer exists.98 In 2012, the accounting firm of BDO Seidman 
entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in which it agreed to pay a $50 million 
fine for helping its clients evade more than $1.3 billion in taxes on more than $6.5 
billion in income.99 
The professionals who worked at these firms were not so fortunate. Nineteen 
individuals, most of whom worked for KPMG, were indicted and charged with 
conspiracy, tax evasion, and obstructing the IRS.100 In 2007, four former partners of 
the accounting firm Ernst & Young were charged with tax fraud, conspiracy, and 
related crimes arising out of tax shelters promoted by Ernst & Young.101 Paul 
Daugerdas, the lead tax shelter promoter at Jenkens & Gilchrist, along with six others, 
was indicted and charged with conspiracy, tax evasion, and obstructing the IRS.102 
Many other professionals have been indicted for their roles in promoting abusive tax 
shelters. In each instance, these tax professionals were charged with creating 
transactions that had no business purpose, lacked economic substance, and were 
papered with false recitations by clients, with the factual recitations having been 
drafted by the professionals themselves. 
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Significantly, while the clients of these professionals were often listed as co-
conspirators, very few of the clients were actually indicted. Instead, the IRS offered a 
global settlement to investors in these shelters that allowed taxpayers to resolve their 
cases by paying civil penalties.103 
This new prosecution policy has helped to transform tax practice. Of course, 
criminal sanctions were not the only arrow in the government’s quiver. New penalties 
applicable to tax shelter investors and their advisors were enacted,104 the IRS adopted 
new rules for giving written tax advice,105 and the government won some key victories 
in civil tax cases against shelters.106 However, the importance of the criminal 
prosecutions and shock of seeing the names of prominent professionals after “United 
States v.” in the header of an indictment should not be underestimated. The result of 
these policies was succinctly stated by former Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax 
Policy, Pamela Olson: “The tax shelter war is over. The government won.”107 
B. The Swiss and Liechtenstein Tax Haven Cases 
The U.S. government’s apparent tolerance of tax havens ended in 2008 when two 
spectacular cases, replete with international espionage, intrigue, and skullduggery, 
brought tax havens into the consciousness of governments, policy makers, and the 
media. Like the tax shelter cases, the egregious nature of these tax haven cases 
changed the government’s policy from one of passive acceptance to active criminal 
investigation and prosecution. 
1. Liechtenstein and LGT 
Liechtenstein is an ancient country whose predecessor was founded in 1342.108 The 
Principality of Liechtenstein was established within the Holy Roman Empire in 1719, 
and it became a sovereign state in 1806. Until the end of World War II, Liechtenstein 
was mainly agricultural and poor. Since then, this tiny country with limited natural 
resources has developed into a prosperous, highly industrialized, free-enterprise 
economy with a vital financial service sector and the highest per capita income in the 
world.109 Until very recently, Liechtenstein also had strict bank secrecy laws,110 which 
caused it to be described as “the most dangerous tax haven in Europe.”111 
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LGT Group, formerly the Liechtenstein Global Trust, is a large private wealth 
and asset management group owned by the royal family of Liechtenstein. The LGT 
Group is wholly owned by the Prince of Liechtenstein Foundation.112 The Prince of 
Liechtenstein Foundation, in turn, is owned by the Royal Family, with Prince Hans-
Adam II as the principal beneficiary.113 The prince enjoys an estimated net worth of 
$5 billion.114 His brother, Prince Philipp von und zu Liechtenstein, is chairman of 
the Board of Trustees of the Foundation, and his son, Prince Max von und zu 
Liechtenstein, serves as CEO.115 
The status of Liechtenstein as a leading tax haven changed on February 14, 
2008, when prosecutors and tax investigators carried out simultaneous raids on the 
headquarters of Deutsche Post, Europe’s biggest postal service, and the private villa 
of its CEO Klaus Zumwinkel. Zumwinkel was arrested on national television. He 
was accused of having evaded approximately $1.5 million in taxes using a 
foundation in Liechtenstein and secreting money in LGT.116 According to an article 
in the German periodical Der Spiegel: “The investigation has taken on a dimension 
previously unknown in Germany. It was the first time in history that the CEO of a 
German blue chip DAX company had been taken from his home by authorities in 
front of live news cameras.”117 Zumwinkel was the CEO of Deutsche Post, and at 
the time of his arrest was one of Germany's most influential businessmen,118 sitting 
on the boards of Postbank and Deutsche Telekom.119 
The extraordinary investigation and arrest of Zumwinkel was the result of 
information received by German investigators. Tax investigators of the German 
government paid a former employee of LGT, Heinrich Kieber, as much as $7.7 
million for bank account data that Kieber had stolen from LGT Group.120 The 
computer discs Germany obtained from Kieber contained about 1400 names, the 
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release of which set off investigations in fourteen countries, including the United 
States.121 
2. The Other Tax Haven Scandal – UBS 
At the same time as the LGT case was unfolding, the activities of Swiss banking 
giant UBS came to light. UBS, formerly Union Bank of Switzerland,122 is “one of 
the largest financial institutions in the world, and has one of the largest private 
banks catering to wealthy individuals.”123 As with the LGT case, the UBS case 
broke because of the involvement of a single employee. Bradley Birkenfeld, a U.S. 
citizen, had worked for UBS as a private banker from 2001 to 2005.124 In 2007 he 
approached the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
(“Subcommittee”) volunteering data on UBS’s private banking practices.125 
Birkenfeld ultimately provided detailed information to prosecutors and to the 
Subcommittee regarding UBS’s solicitation of clients in the United States.126 
The 2008 report of the Subcommittee describes the lengths to which UBS 
employees went to obtain new clients in the United States and to hide those 
activities from the U.S. government. U.S. securities law requires persons who 
provide securities products or services within the United States to be registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).127 UBS was licensed to 
operate as a bank in the United States, and it had 437 offices in the United States 
that could assist its U.S. clients.128 However, UBS’s banking and securities licenses 
did not extend to its non-U.S. offices.129 Nevertheless, UBS instructed its Swiss 
bankers to find new clients (and new money) in the United States and to encourage 
those clients to open accounts in Switzerland.130 If a foreign financial institution 
executes sales of non-U.S. securities, the institution must report the transaction to 
the IRS on a Form 1099 if the sales are affected in the United States.131 
During the years at issue, UBS had “written policies restricting the marketing 
and client-related activities that could be undertaken in the United States by UBS 
bankers from outside the country.”132 Despite these stated policies, UBS 
encouraged and even paid for its Swiss bankers to travel to the United States to 
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develop new business and service existing clients.133 According to the Senate 
Report, Birkenfeld told the Subcommittee that, during his four years at UBS, the 
private bankers from Switzerland typically traveled to the United States four to six 
times per year, using their trips to recruit new clients and to provide financial 
services to existing clients.134 Birkenfeld also testified that UBS provided its Swiss 
bankers with tickets and funds to go to events attended by wealthy U.S. individuals 
so that they could solicit new business for UBS in Switzerland.135 Indeed, UBS 
regularly sponsored events in the United States like golf and tennis tournaments, art 
fairs, and other special events in wealthy areas.136 These events were designed to 
allow UBS bankers access to high-net-worth individuals. According to the 
Subcommittee report, UBS also assigned its Swiss bankers specific performance 
goals to bring “net new money” (NNM) into the Swiss bank from the United 
States.137 According to the Subcommittee’s report: 
A UBS business plan for the years 2003 through 2005, provides context 
for the Swiss focus on obtaining U.S. clients. This document observes 
that “31% of World’s UHNWIs [Ultra High Net Worth Individuals] are 
in North America (USA + Canada).” It also observes that the United 
States has 222 billionaires with a combined net worth of $706 billion. 
This type of information helps explain why UBS dedicated significant 
resources to obtaining U.S. clients for its private banking operations in 
Switzerland. It also explains why the Swiss effort to attract billions to 
their tax haven may have contributed to the huge tax loss to the U.S. 
treasury.138 
UBS also employed systems for its Swiss bankers so that their services for their 
U.S. clients would not be discovered by U.S. authorities. UBS private bankers were 
instructed to “keep a low profile during their business trips to avoid attracting 
attention from U.S. authorities.”139 Some UBS Swiss private bankers who visited 
the United States on business told U.S. customs officials that they were in the 
country for nonbusiness reasons. UBS even provided its private bankers with 
training on how to avoid surveillance by U.S. customs agents and law enforcement 
officers.140 According to Birkenfeld, Swiss bankers took elaborate measures to 
disguise or encrypt the account information they brought with them to prevent it 
from falling into the wrong hands.141 Finally, contrary to U.S. laws and express 
UBS policies, “some UBS Swiss bankers communicated with their U.S. clients by 
telephone, fax, mail and email, to market securities products and services, and to 
carry out securities transactions.”142 
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Once accounts were opened, UBS took additional steps to ensure that the 
accounts of U.S. clients were not discovered by the IRS or the SEC. UBS set up 
secret bank accounts, so-called “undeclared accounts,” and it assured clients that 
UBS was not required to disclose those accounts and account information was 
shielded by Swiss bank secrecy laws.143 UBS not only maintained secret undeclared 
accounts for U.S. clients but also took steps to assist its U.S. clients to structure 
their Swiss accounts to avoid reporting to the IRS information required by the 
Qualified Intermediary (QI) program.144 UBS provided private banking services to 
approximately 20,000 clients, and nearly 19,000 of these clients concealed their 
identities and their ownership of the accounts from the IRS.145 UBS reportedly 
earned $200 million in fees per year from these accounts.146 
As a result of the information provided by Birkenfeld, UBS entered into a 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) in which it agreed to pay a fine of $780 
million.147 As part of the DPA, UBS admitted that from 2002 until 2007, private 
bankers and managers in the United States participated in a scheme to defraud the 
IRS by assisting individual taxpayers in establishing accounts at UBS in a manner 
designed to conceal the taxpayers’ ownership or beneficial interest in these 
accounts.148 The private bankers helped create accounts in the names of offshore 
companies, which allowed U.S. taxpayers to evade reporting requirements on these 
accounts without being discovered by the IRS.149 “Although UBS AG signed a QI 
agreement with the United States in 2001, UBS has never filed 1099 Forms 
reporting these accounts to the IRS, contending that these U.S. client accounts fall 
outside its QI reporting obligations.150 UBS refer[red] to these accounts internally 
as ‘undeclared accounts.’”151 The IRS has alleged that UBS had 52,000 such 
accounts.152 These accounts held billions of dollars that were not disclosed to the 
IRS.153 
Despite his contributions to the government’s case against UBS, Birkenfeld was 
charged and pled guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States (a so-called 
Klein conspiracy).154 The indictment charged Birkenfeld with falsifying Swiss bank 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. Id. at 83. 
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 145. Id. at 84. 
 146. Carlyn Kolker & David Voreacos, Ex-UBS Banker Birkenfeld Pleads Guilty in Tax 
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/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aLI2YNVAxDLM. 
 147. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 3, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033 
(S.D. Fla. dismissed Oct. 25, 2010) [hereinafter UBS DPA], available at http://
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 152. Reeves Declaration, supra note 128, ¶ 24. 
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 154. Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Pleads Guilty in Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, June 
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documents and IRS Forms, failing to prepare and issue required IRS Forms, setting 
up nominee entities, and failing to comply with the terms of the QI program 
agreement with the IRS in order to conceal from the IRS U.S.-source income paid 
into Swiss bank accounts beneficially owned by U. S. taxpayers.155 Birkenfeld also 
acted as a personal courier for his clients, at one point smuggling diamonds into the 
United States in a toothpaste tube.156 He was sentenced to forty months in jail—an 
extraordinary sentence for a whistleblower who, it can be argued, single-handedly 
brought down UBS.157 However, Birkenfeld received $104 million as a whistle-
blower award from the IRS.158 
In 2012, the government indicted Switzerland’s oldest bank, Wegelin Bank, and 
three of its partners. They were charged with assisting U.S. taxpayers, many of 
whom were former UBS clients, in evading their taxes.159 The indictments 
appeared at first to be largely posturing by prosecutors, since Wegelin had no U.S. 
presence and the individuals were unlikely to make themselves available for 
extradition.160 As a result of the indictment, however, the bank essentially ceased to 
exist as an independent entity within a month.161 In January 2013, Wegelin pled 
guilty and formally ceased operations.162 The Department of Justice has 
investigations pending against at least eleven other Swiss banks.163 Charges against 
additional banks or bankers appear likely. 
As with the tax shelter prosecutions, relatively few of the U.S. depositors have 
been prosecuted.164 Instead, the IRS and DOJ offered qualified immunity in the 
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form of a series of offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives.165 In an effort to obtain 
the names of those U.S. taxpayers who held undeclared accounts at UBS, the U.S. 
government filed a so-called John Doe summons.166 Significantly, the John Doe 
summons litigation was resolved by agreement between the U.S. and the Swiss 
governments (and not UBS).167 
The tax haven bank prosecutions and offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives 
have dramatically changed the way in which U.S. taxpayers view and utilize tax 
haven banks.168 The decision to prosecute tax and banking professionals therefore 
appears on many levels to be a success. But is the government’s new prosecution 
policy the right one? The next two Parts will address this question. 
III. THE NEW PROSECUTION POLICY AND CRIMINAL THEORY 
It may seem credulous to ask whether prosecuting lawyers, accountants, and 
bankers for assisting their clients in evading their taxes is the “right” policy. 
However, the question of whether conduct should result in a criminal charge is 
often not easy to answer.169 Indeed, legal thinkers and philosophers have long 
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 169. The government’s change in policy might arguably be sufficient to question the 
propriety of the current policy; that is, if it is so obvious that Swiss bankers should be 
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struggled with defining precisely what is and what should be criminal.170 The 
challenge is to distinguish between actions that warrant criminal prosecution and 
those that only justify civil penalties or no penalty at all. At its most basic, criminal 
law should sanction conduct that is only unequivocally wrong or clearly 
blameworthy.171 As H. L. A. Hart noted, “Why are certain kinds of action forbidden 
by law and so made crimes or offences? The answer is: To announce to society that 
these actions are not to be done and to secure that fewer of them are done.”172 
At a minimum, before criminal liability can be imposed, the conduct in question 
should be clearly distinguishable from conduct that is not subject to criminal 
penalties.173 This clear distinction is essential to our criminal justice system.174 
Doctrines such as the rule of lenity and void for vagueness,175 as well as the Ex 
Post Facto Clause,176 all essentially ask whether the criminal statute in question has 
made it reasonably clear that the defendant's conduct was criminal.177 In addition, 
only upon criminal investigation or indictment will certain constitutional 
protections be applied.178 Thus, a lack of clarity and firm definition of what is and 
should be criminal is worrisome, given that so many rights and indeed some of the 
greatest rights—life, liberty, and property—are dependent upon this distinction.179 
Traditional definitions of what conduct is criminal requires that there be both an 
actus reus and mens rea.180 There also must be a public element to the conduct, 
since it is a violation of the public order of the State, the People, or the United 
States in whose name the case is brought that makes a matter criminal.181 To 
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borrow a phrase from Henry II’s time, it is the King’s peace that is being 
violated.182 But on closer inspection, even these most basic definitions begin to 
blur. If we assume that a crime must have some sort of act (actus reus), that 
definition of crime breaks down in practice. For example, it is a crime to fail to file 
a tax return.183 Thus, the “guilty act” in that crime is in reality the failure to act.184 
One can also be guilty of attempts and other inchoate crimes, where the act has not 
been completed or perfected. In these cases it is the desire to bring about the result, 
rather than the act itself that is the crime.185 
In conspiracy law the outer reaches of the actus reus requirement are 
encountered. The essence of a conspiracy is the agreement itself.186 In order to 
establish the existence of an agreement, the prosecution must show that the 
defendant and at least one other person reached an understanding or agreement to 
carry out the objective of the conspiracy.187 As long as a defendant understands the 
unlawful nature of the scheme and knowingly and intentionally joins in that 
scheme, that is sufficient to convict him or her for conspiracy. Thus, while we have 
traditionally defined a crime as one that requires an actus reus and mens rea, in 
modern conspiracy law a person can be convicted of a crime by merely agreeing to 
participate in some future illegal venture.188 No act or failure to act by that person is 
required.189 
The ambiguity of criminal law is even more pronounced in the case of white- 
collar crimes, where it is often difficult to determine whether the actions in 
question should be subject to criminal liability. In this regard, Stuart Green stated: 
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[W]hat distinguishes “white-collar” offenses such as bribery, 
obstruction of justice, perjury, and insider trading from core “blue 
collar” offenses such as murder, rape, and assault is that the white-
collar crimes tend to be more “morally ambiguous” than the core 
crimes. That is, in a surprisingly large number of cases there is genuine 
doubt as to whether what the defendant did was in fact morally wrong. 
In such cases, the issue is not, as it is with necessity, whether the 
defendant was confronted with some extraordinary choice between 
either obeying the law, and allowing significant harm to occur, or 
violating the law, and preventing such harm. Rather, the question is 
whether the conduct engaged in was more or less acceptable behavior 
that should not have been subject to criminal sanctions in the first 
place.190 
Even if the focus was to shift from whether conduct should be subject to 
criminal sanctions to whether conduct in fact falls within existing criminal statutes, 
the answer is little clearer. When looking at the statutes regarding white-collar 
crimes, the action not to be done191 is far from clear, and the line between what is 
criminal and what is civil is blurred at best. 
A good example is one of the oldest federal crimes, mail fraud.192 The mail 
fraud statute provides in pertinent part: “Whoever, having devised or intending to 
devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,” uses the mails 
for the purpose of executing the scheme, is guilty of a felony punishable by up to 
twenty years in prison.193 What constitutes a scheme or artifice to defraud? Pretty 
much any conduct, it seems. The Fifth Circuit “defined” this as any “conduct which 
fails to match the ‘reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair 
play and right dealing in the general and business life of members of society.’”194 It 
has also been summarized as “an effort to gain an undue advantage or to bring 
about some harm through misrepresentation or breach of duty.”195 
What rights are protected and who should be protected from harm? Property?196 
Honest services?197 Since the mail fraud statute is a criminal statute—a twenty-year 
felony no less!—we must assume that it covers only conduct that is clearly 
blameworthy.198 However, even a cursory tour through the case law in this area 
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shows this not to be the case.199 “The federal criminal code is filled with crimes that 
have neither common-law analogues nor well-established public meanings. Mail 
fraud has no public definition, no Platonic form on which to model the relevant 
criminal statute. Congress is free to define the crime as it wishes.”200 
A. The Ambiguity of Tax Crimes 
As Stuart Green has noted, tax crimes suffer from ambiguity in spades.201 This 
ambiguity problem is both definitional and moral.202 Reducing one’s taxes through 
“avoidance” measures or strategies is perfectly legal and long-accepted conduct,203 
while reducing one’s taxes through “evasion” is a crime. However, the line between 
legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion is often not clear.204 For example, it is a 
crime to move assets out of the reach of the IRS to avoid the payment of taxes.205 If 
a taxpayer knows the IRS is about to levy on a bank account, is it a crime for the 
taxpayer not to deposit a paycheck into that bank account? Likely not. Is it a crime 
to open a new bank account in the taxpayer’s name in the same city and deposit the 
check in that account? Again, likely not. What about opening an account in another 
city or another country? At this point, most would probably agree that a crime has 
been committed. In each instance the taxpayer has taken actions to avoid (and 
arguably evade) the payment of his or her taxes, and yet only the more egregious 
actions are deemed to be criminal. 
What differentiates legal avoidance from illegal evasion is the mental state of 
the taxpayer. It is because the taxpayer intentionally violates a known legal duty 
that his act is criminal.206 Thus, tax crimes, perhaps more than any other type of 
crime, are illegal solely because of the mental state of the actor.207 While it is true 
that nearly every crime requires a mens rea,208 the underlying conduct in nontax 
crimes is at least frowned upon in its noncriminal guise.209 For example, while 18 
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U.S.C. § 1001 criminalizes only knowingly and willfully making a materially false 
statement to a government official, no one would argue that it is acceptable to make 
nonwillful false statements to an FBI agent—it might not be a crime, but it is still 
not acceptable behavior. By contrast, tax minimization is not generally frowned 
upon and indeed is looked upon by many as a social good. Learned Hand’s 
aphorism is a perfect example: “Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes 
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best 
pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”210 
Moreover, much of the professional tax services industry is based on the notion that 
tax minimization is right and proper.211 Accordingly, precisely the same conduct 
causing precisely the same harm212 can be criminal or not, depending on the mental 
state of the taxpayer. 
Basing prosecution decisions either solely or primarily on the mental state of the 
person committing the act is even more troubling when the taxpayer is a 
corporation. More than 100 years ago, the Supreme Court resolved the question of 
whether corporations can commit crimes and held that if a corporation can enter 
into contracts and lay railroad tracks, it can commit crimes.213 But in the context of 
the tax crimes, how does a corporate defendant “know” what the tax laws require 
and “intentionally” violate these laws? How can a corporation “know” the object of 
a conspiracy and agree to join in it? In answering these questions, the First Circuit 
stated: 
The acts of a corporation are, after all, simply the acts of all of its 
employees operating within the scope of their employment. The law on 
corporate criminal liability reflects this. Similarly, the knowledge 
obtained by corporate employees acting within the scope of their 
employment is imputed to the corporation. Corporations 
compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific 
duties and operations into smaller components. The aggregate of those 
components constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular 
operation. It is irrelevant whether employees administering one 
component of an operation know the specific activities of employees 
administering another aspect of the operation . . . .214 
Thus, the legal fiction that a corporation is a person carries over to the “mental 
state” of the corporate personage in the collective knowledge doctrine. 215 But as 
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Professor David Luban noted, this doctrine “treats employees as synapses in the 
nonexistent brain of a legal fiction,” where the corporation knows the sum of all of 
the knowledge of its employees, whether or not they discussed what they knew or 
actually combined their knowledge.216 Such a theory teeters on the “brink of quack 
metaphysics or mystical science fiction, treating groups of people as single 
minds.”217 Thus, tax crimes, when applied to corporations with multiple actors who 
must collectively “know” the law and “intentionally” violate it, achieve the acme of 
ambiguity. It is little wonder the Tax Division of the Department of Justice has a 
stated policy preferring to prosecute individuals rather than corporations.218 
B. Inconsistent Enforcement 
Adding to the ambiguity of tax and other white-collar criminal statutes is the 
inconsistent nature of white-collar criminal enforcement. No criminal law is 
uniformly enforced, but this lack of uniformity is more pronounced in white-collar 
criminal cases. Inconsistent and uneven enforcement is due not only to the limited 
availability of resources,219 but also to structural reasons. White-collar crimes are 
not like violent felonies, for which investigation and prosecution are almost 
mandatory. Rather, for federal white-collar crimes, prosecution is almost always 
optional.220 “Federal law is thus a source of options rather than obligations. With 
very little in the way of legal or political constraints, federal prosecutors are the 
criminal justice system’s free agents.”221 Thus, the “law” that federal prosecutors 
make is much more likely a result of the prosecutors’ preferences than those of the 
legislature.222 
Tax crimes showcase the inconsistent enforcement of federal crimes. As 
discussed, tax crimes are, in essence, violations of the tax laws where one does so 
“willfully.”223 Thus, one can file an incorrect return and be subject to negligence 
penalties or no penalties at all.224 However, if one willfully files an incorrect (read: 
false) return, that could result in a criminal charge of filing a false tax return or tax 
evasion.225 Similarly, if a person fails to file a tax return, a failure to file penalty 
may be imposed.226 However, if that failure to file is willful, a criminal charge may 
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result.227 Thus, if a person knows of the legal duty to file and intentionally does not 
do so, he or she is, under the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, guilty 
of the misdemeanor of failure to file. 
Yet very few tax violations that fit the literal definition are prosecuted or even 
investigated as criminal cases. The proof of willfulness in a failure to file case can 
be shown by the fact that the taxpayer filed in prior years, thereby demonstrating 
the taxpayer knew of the duty to file.228 Without some excuse like illness or 
incapacity, a failure to file case should be easy for the government to prove. 
Nevertheless, remarkably few tax cases are investigated and prosecuted.229 And this 
is not attributable to just the allocation of scarce resources, which, as indicated, 
undoubtedly plays a role. This is not a case in which selling drugs is illegal, but 
there are too many drug transactions for them all to be prosecuted. In those cases, 
police and prosecutors do not maintain that the narcotics transaction is legal. 
However, many cases that would clearly be provable as a tax crime are not even 
viewed as criminal in nature by IRS personnel. Routine failures to file, even those 
that have lasted a decade or more, are rarely thought to be criminal, unless the 
taxpayer had illegal income or had some other aggravating factor.230 Indeed, in 
cases of a failure to file of ten or more years, the IRS generally only asks for six 
years of returns.231 IRS agents have a duty to refer cases for criminal investigation 
where they have uncovered “firm indications of fraud,”232 but cases that are clearly 
within that definition are nonetheless not consistently referred. It is not the mere 
failure to file or omission of income that warrants a criminal referral.233 Rather, it 
generally must be combined with some other fraudulent or obstructive act.234 
Accordingly, the vagueness of tax crimes and other white-collar crimes must be 
viewed not only from the perspective of not knowing what is illegal and will be 
prosecuted, but also from the perspective that what is clearly illegal will not be 
prosecuted. As discussed more fully below, this failure to prosecute clear violations 
of the law gave some people the impression that they could act with impunity. 
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C. The Problems with All This Vagueness 
The vagueness of white-collar criminal statutes does not, of course, render every 
prosecution immediately suspect. However, it is (or should be) a concern for 
policymakers and anyone who has an interest in good government. Society will 
lose faith in the criminal justice system if the law is perceived as being applied 
arbitrarily or unfairly.235 The fundamental problem with the vagueness of these 
statutes is that it shifts who ultimately defines what is criminal from the legislature 
to prosecutors. This is not a new problem. As was noted more than 250 years ago, 
“Nay whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws it 
is he who is the lawgiver to all intents and purposes and not the person who first 
wrote or spake them.”236 
Thus, at one level, regardless of the merits of any given prosecution, the 
“existence and exercise of prosecutorial discretion are inconsistent with the most 
fundamental principles of our system of justice and our basic notions of fair play 
and efficient criminal administration.”237 If a law is vague, anything or nothing fits 
the definition. Prosecutors can tolerate conduct and then condemn it without any 
justification. As Justice Jackson stated: “With the law books filled with a great 
assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a 
technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone.”238 The number and 
breadth of federal crimes has exploded in the seventy years since that statement 
was uttered. The vagueness of criminal statutes allows prosecutors, rather than 
legislatures, to define what is criminal and what is not. 
The presence of judge and jury to prevent convictions does not fully remedy this 
problem. First, as has become more apparent with the work of programs such as the 
Innocence Project around the country, innocent people do get convicted of crimes 
they did not commit.239 Second, the gravity of the decision to charge cannot be 
underestimated, for once a person is charged and becomes a “defendant,” his or her 
life will never be the same again. And, as the prosecution of Arthur Andersen 
proved, for institutional targets indictment alone can be a death sentence.240 
                                                                                                                 
 
 235. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME (1995). 
 236. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141 (2d ed. 1994) (attributing the quote to 
Bishop Hoadly). 
 237. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 
1554 (1981). 
 238. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 19 (1940). 
 239. See, e.g., Sara Jean Green, 3 Convicted in State Cleared, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2010, at B1, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2013726446
_innocence21m.html. 
 240. Arthur Andersen, formerly the world’s largest accounting firm, shut down within 
months of its indictment, even before its trial and conviction. “During such time, there was 
considerable debate within the DOJ as to the legal, practical, and moral consequences of 
indictments against corporate defendants. Those discussions emphasized that while corporate 
wrongdoers needed to be brought to justice, regulators also needed to carefully consider the 
collateral consequences of corporate prosecutions.” John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The 
Recent and Unusual Evolution of an Expanding FCPA, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 25, 31 (2012). 
2014] MAGNIFYING DETERRENCE 539 
 
Thus, the pervasive ambiguity in criminal statutes is a cause for concern. Most 
of the literature in this area addresses overenforcement of criminal law and the 
disparate treatment that decisions to prosecute entail.241 However, it is also 
necessary to examine the impact of underenforcement and the decision not to bring 
prosecutions.242 Underenforcement, among other problems, erodes citizens’ beliefs 
in and commitment to follow the law and to the legal system itself.243 And while 
much of the scholarship in this area has been focused on the impact enforcement 
failures have had on so-called “underenforcement zones” and the racial and ethnic 
minorities within these communities, underenforcement can also impact the laws 
themselves.244 
There is perhaps no better example of the impact of underenforcement on 
citizens’ views of the law than in tax enforcement.245 The decades of tolerating the 
tax shelter industry contributed to its expansion, leading to a situation in which the 
best and brightest in the tax field were creating transactions out of whole cloth that 
generated losses in the hundreds of millions of dollars.246 Likewise, tolerance of, or 
at least indifference to, offshore bank accounts led at least in part to their 
expansion.247 
D. Prosecution Policies 
Given the vagueness of criminal statutes, particularly tax and other white-collar 
criminal statutes, it is essential that prosecutors be guided by definite prosecution 
policies. What, then, should prosecutors consider in deciding whether and whom to 
prosecute? While a full treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of this paper, a 
few fundamentals can be gleaned. As Professor Antony Duff stated: 
[T]he most plausible immediate good that a system of punishment can 
bring is the prevention of crime: a rational consequentialist system of 
law will define as criminal only conduct that is in some way harmful; in 
preventing crime we will thus be preventing the harms that crime 
causes; and punishment can prevent crime by incapacitating, or 
deterring, or reforming potential offenders.248 
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Thus, criminal law seeks to incapacitate offenders, deter future offenses, reform 
offenders, and obtain retribution on behalf of victims.249 
The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual instructs federal prosecutors to pursue a criminal 
prosecution only if the person’s conduct constitutes a federal offense and 
admissible evidence will “probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a 
conviction.”250 The only limits placed on this broad grant of authority is that a 
prosecution should nevertheless not be pursued if there is no “substantial federal 
interest” involved in the case, the person is subject to effective prosecution 
elsewhere, or there is a sufficient noncriminal alternative to prosecution.251 The 
definition of “substantial federal interest” instructs prosecutors that in determining 
whether there is a substantial federal interest, a prosecutor should weigh all relevant 
considerations, including: federal law enforcement priorities, the nature and 
seriousness of the offense, the deterrent effect of the prosecution, and the target’s 
culpability.252 
These prosecution policies are further amplified by the policies concerning the 
investigation and prosecution of business entities. This policy instructs that the 
prosecution of corporate crime is a “high priority” for the Department of Justice.253 
It then outlines the “critical public interests” that are promoted by the investigation 
and prosecution of business entities, including: (1) protecting the integrity of the 
capital markets, (2) protecting consumers, investors, and competing business 
entities, and (3) protecting the environment.254 
The Criminal Tax Case Procedures in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual is even more 
explicit in defining a prosecution policy in tax cases: 
The Government helps to preserve the integrity of this Nation’s self-
assessment tax system through vigorous and uniform criminal 
enforcement of the internal revenue laws. Criminal prosecutions punish 
tax law violators and deter other persons who would violate those laws. 
To achieve maximum deterrence, the Government must pursue broad, 
balanced, and uniform criminal tax enforcement. Uniformity in tax 
cases is necessary because tax enforcement potentially affects more 
individuals than any other area of criminal enforcement.255 
Thus, the government’s prosecution policies, particularly the Tax Division’s policy, 
follow the traditional bases for criminal liability: retribution and deterrence, 
particularly general deterrence. The importance of general deterrence in tax cases 
has been codified in the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s sentencing guidelines, 
which provide: 
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The criminal tax laws are designed to protect the public interest in 
preserving the integrity of the nation’s tax system. Criminal tax 
prosecutions serve to punish the violator and promote respect for the 
tax laws. Because of the limited number of criminal tax prosecutions 
relative to the estimated incidence of such violations, deterring others 
from violating the tax laws is a primary consideration underlying these 
guidelines. Recognition that the sentence for a criminal tax case will be 
commensurate with the gravity of the offense should act as a deterrent 
to would-be violators.256 
The Tax Division’s policy, however, departs somewhat from traditional 
rationales in that the stated purpose of the criminal enforcement program is also “to 
preserv[e] the integrity” of the civil tax system.257 The policy also specifically 
provides that maximum deterrence depends upon uniform and consistent criminal 
enforcement.258 Hence, the Tax Division is the only division authorized to approve 
an indictment for tax crimes, and an individual U.S. attorney may not bring a tax 
prosecution without the approval of the Tax Division.259 As discussed above, the 
government’s prosecution policy did not always preserve the integrity of the tax 
system.260 
Finally, in deciding whether to proceed against an entity or the individuals who 
took the actions on behalf of the entity, the Department of Justice looks at the 
nature and seriousness of the offense committed, the pervasiveness of wrongdoing 
within the entity, including whether high-level management condoned the conduct, 
and the entity’s history of similar misconduct.261 Examining these factors allows 
the government to decide whether the actions are those of rogue individuals within 
the entity or if the conduct is such that it can be said that the entity itself committed 
the criminal act. The government also examines whether the entity timely and 
voluntarily disclosed the wrongdoing and cooperated in the investigation, whether 
the entity had a viable compliance program, and whether the entity took remedial 
action.262 These factors tend to show whether the problems within the entity are 
systemic, and therefore should be attributed to the entity, or whether they are 
isolated instances that have been corrected. Finally, in deciding whether to pursue 
criminal, rather than civil sanctions, prosecutors will examine the collateral 
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consequences of a prosecution on third parties such as shareholders, pension 
holders, employees, and others who are not culpable; the adequacy of the 
prosecution of individuals responsible; and the adequacy of civil remedies.263 In 
addition to the factors applicable to all federal prosecutions, Department of Justice 
policy provides that the Tax Division has a “strong preference for prosecuting 
responsible individuals, rather than entities, for corporate tax offenses.”264 
Accordingly, if we are to judge—and judge we will—the government’s new 
prosecution policy regarding professionals using the government’s own articulated 
bases, the following standards will be weighed: (1) culpability of the person 
charged, including the person’s relative culpability in relation to other actors not 
charged; (2) retribution, including compensation of the crime victim; (3) deterrent 
effect (especially general deterrence) that would result from the prosecution; and 
(4) protection of the integrity of the civil tax system. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW PROSECUTION POLICY 
Before analyzing the soundness of the tax shelter and tax haven prosecutions, a 
threshold question must be asked: Were the decisions to bring a series of criminal 
prosecutions where, in the past, no such prosecution would likely have been 
brought, a change in policy, or were these decisions based on the egregious facts of 
these cases? The answer is, I think, a little of both. It was because of the egregious 
facts, enormous dollar amounts involved, and the complicity of the upper echelons 
of the tax profession that caused the government to change its policies. Moreover, 
“the government” is not a monolithic entity detached from the human beings who 
run it. Thus, the change in policy can in part be traced to the individuals who were 
the decision makers in the Tax Division and other parts of the Justice 
Department.265 
That being said, these prosecutions do not appear to be isolated instances or 
anomalies. More than seven years after the KPMG deferred prosecution agreement, 
the government is still pursuing tax professionals for their roles in peddling abusive 
tax shelters.266 The government continues to go after Swiss banks; the indictment 
and conviction of Wegelin Bank,267 and the deferred prosecution agreement with 
HSBC Bank268 are the most recent examples. While the government continues to 
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prosecute a few individual taxpayers for hiding money offshore,269 the IRS offered 
its third offshore voluntary disclosure initiative in 2012.270 Thus, the policy of 
prosecuting professionals has continued with the change of administrations, and it 
appears that this policy will continue into the future. Assuming that is the case, are 
these prosecutions consistent with the goals and theories underlying federal 
criminal prosecutions in general and tax prosecutions in particular? 
A. Tax Shelters 
1. Relative Culpability 
In examining the culpability of the professionals and their relative culpability 
vis-à-vis their clients, the decision to go after the professionals and not the 
taxpayers themselves was the right choice. It is the role of tax professionals to 
know what is an acceptable structure and what is pure tax fantasy. Circular 230 and 
the Rules of Professional Conduct impose a duty on tax attorneys and other 
professionals to advise clients only on legitimate transactions.271 And it is the tax 
professionals who have the background, knowledge, and experience to know which 
transactions are legitimate and which are not. What was truly egregious about these 
transactions is that not only did the professionals misapply the law, they created the 
“facts” underlying these bogus transactions.272 
The tax system has long accepted that taxpayers may rely on the advice of the 
professionals they hire.273 And, given the complexity and obtuseness of the tax 
laws, taxpayers cannot be faulted for relying on their advisors in what appear to be 
artificial transactions. Taxpayers enter into transactions structured in a way to 
maximize tax benefits because they have been advised by tax professionals to 
structure them in that way. For example, businesspeople do not really need 
structures like S Corporations for their business operations, but they have been 
advised that this is a tax-efficient way to set up a business. And if they find the 
documents they sign and the structures they are advised to create a bit strange, they 
simply believe this is one of the many mysterious things about the way the tax 
system works. If they are then told that they cannot structure a transaction in a 
certain way because it was done solely for tax purposes, they may be left more than 
a little perplexed. As Professor Freedman observed: 
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What message are such people being given by the tax system? Are they 
to think of tax in terms of economic reality, fairness and rationality 
when it at first appears that incorporation will legitimately save tax and 
they then find that some of those benefits have been negated in a 
complex way that will probably cost them considerable amounts in 
professional fees? The law has real substance here because it has 
consequences in terms of rights and obligations. . . . Right from the 
start he has been given a signal that it is necessary to take account of 
taxation when making commercial decisions and that the rules can 
change. The culture of artificiality is established and so it continues. . . . 
In the light of this, it is not surprising that business owners will soon 
come to believe that it is perfectly natural to do artificial things for tax 
purposes and that this impression permeates right up the scale to large 
companies whose directors, used to tax impacting on all their decisions, 
consider it fair game to take tax into consideration in all planning and 
then to go on to undertake tax driven activities.274 
If the transactions these taxpayers entered into looked artificial and were entered 
into solely for tax purposes, the response of many of these taxpayers would quite 
innocently be, “so what’s your point?” Thus, in examining the culpability and 
relative culpability, the professionals were the appropriate target. 
Nevertheless, prosecutors, particularly those with ultimate decision-making 
authority, must be circumspect in using the prosecution of lawyers to deter the 
conduct of clients. As discussed above, the line between legal conduct and illegal 
conduct can be quite slim and vague. Statutes that prohibit impeding “the due 
administration” of the tax laws275 may apply to legal conduct, as well as nefarious 
conduct.276 The prosecution of Lauren Stevens is an apt example of the principle 
that one person’s representation is another one’s fraud.277 
2. Compensating the Victim  
The strategy of targeting the most culpable for criminal prosecution, while 
imposing stiff civil penalties on the taxpayers who benefited from these schemes, 
netted large amounts of money for the government. Approximately 2000 taxpayers 
                                                                                                                 
 
 274. Judith Freedman, Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-
Avoidance Principle, [2004] B.T.R. 332, 344–45. 
 275. 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (2012). 
 276. See, e.g., Schumacher, supra note 19. 
 277. Lauren Stevens, former vice president and associate general counsel of 
pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), had been charged with obstruction of justice 
and making false statements during a civil investigation of GSK by the Food and Drug 
Administration. Id. At the close of the government’s case, the district court dismissed the 
case against Stevens, holding that the statements were made in the course of her bona fide 
legal representation of a client and in good-faith reliance on both external and internal 
lawyers for GSK. Transcript of Proceedings at 5, United States v. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d 
556 (D. Md. 2011) (No. 8:10-cr-00694-RWT). The court further held that “only with a 
jaundiced eye and with an inference of guilt that’s inconsistent with the presumption of 
innocence could a reasonable jury ever convict this defendant” and that “it would be a 
miscarriage of justice to permit this case to go to the jury.” Id. at 8–9. 
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who invested in twenty-one different tax shelters accepted the IRS’s global 
settlement terms and paid over $2 billion in back taxes and interest.278 In addition, 
nearly eighty-five percent of taxpayers known by the IRS to have invested in the 
Son of BOSS tax shelter elected to settle under a different program and paid more 
than $4 billion in taxes, penalties, and interest.279 Part of what was so galling about 
these shelters was the amount of money involved in the transactions and the place 
the lawyers and accountants occupied in the profession. These were some of the 
most well-heeled taxpayers and the most successful tax practitioners.280 Ironically, 
from a restitution perspective, the wealth and success of the professionals, their 
firms, and the taxpayers themselves allowed the government to be compensated at a 
relatively high rate.281 Thus, while not all shelters were discovered and targeted, the 
ones that were detected netted a decent return for the government. From the 
perspective of compensating the victim, the strategy employed was effective. 
3. Deterrence 
Arguably the strongest and best reason for prosecuting the tax advisors is the 
deterrent effect of these cases. As discussed above, general deterrence is the 
primary objective in tax prosecutions.282 Given the large number of taxpayers,283 
and the relatively few tax prosecutions each year, the prosecutions that are brought 
must dissuade others, many others, from committing a similar crime. Prosecuting 
tax professionals accomplishes this objective, only more so: the tax shelter 
transactions would not have been possible without the participation of the lawyers, 
accountants, and bankers. Even the most sophisticated taxpayers would not have 
dreamt up the structures and transactions of these shelters. And, without the legal 
documents and counterparties created by the facilitators, the transactions could not 
have been carried out. Perhaps even more importantly, the taxpayers would not 
have entered into these transactions without the tax opinions drafted by the lawyers 
and accountants.284 Thus, the professionals were central to execution of these 
schemes. 
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Shutting down the professionals effectively shut down the shelters.285 And this, 
whether intentional or not, is ultimately the wisdom of these prosecutions. 
Prosecuting professionals deters not only taxpayers, but also other professionals 
from advising on these types of abusive transactions.286 Since professionals are the 
enablers and taxpayers cannot enter into these transactions without the 
professionals, the current prosecution policy is likely to be more effective than 
pursuing the taxpayers themselves. Moreover, given that there are far fewer 
professionals than taxpayers, prosecuting professionals can achieve both specific 
and general deterrence more efficiently than prosecuting taxpayers. Thus, the 
prosecutions of professionals causes a ripple effect beyond the normal tax 
prosecution.287 
4. Preserving the Integrity of the Tax System 
Finally, the decision to bring criminal cases against the lawyers and accountants 
helped to preserve and indeed restore the integrity of the tax system.288 The long-
term decision not to prosecute investors in tax shelters or their advisors led, at least 
in part, to the rise of shelters.289 During the 1990s, in response to the competitive 
pressure in the auditing field, the national accounting firms dedicated tremendous 
amounts of resources to retaining the best and brightest in the tax community.290 
These professionals were not put into the traditional auditing roles, but were 
assigned to the tax shelter “consulting” practices.291 Those practices became large 
profit centers for the firms.292 Without the specter of liability, either civil, criminal, 
or professional, these shelters grew in complexity and egregiousness. For example, 
in an internal memorandum, a KPMG partner acknowledged that the strategy at 
issue was a “tax shelter” and subject to registration as such under 26 U.S.C. § 
6111.293 However, the partner recommended that it not be registered, reasoning that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 285. See Fleischer, supra note 107. 
 286. See Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax 
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the firm’s financial exposure was minimal, other promoters were not registering tax 
shelters, registering would put the firm at a “severe competitive disadvantage,” and 
that the IRS had shown a “lack of enthusiasm” for enforcing the registration 
requirements.294 In the end, firms admitted to creating these transactions out of 
whole cloth.295 
These cases were worse for the system than prior shelters. The involvement of 
the best professionals in these cases threatened the very fabric of the tax system. 
The corrosive effect of the sense that “everybody is doing it,” especially when 
“everybody” includes the top professionals, cannot be underestimated. One of the 
beliefs of many taxpayers is that only a fool pays the full amount of tax, or as 
Leona Helmsley so eloquently stated, “Only the little people pay taxes.”296 And 
there is a belief that if we only find the right tax advisor, we will only be required 
to pay that which we are constitutionally obligated to forfeit.297 If tax professionals 
believe that they are fools if they don’t give a tax opinion when everyone else is 
giving them, the entire system breaks down. 
The decision to prosecute helped to restore that equilibrium. Of course, criminal 
prosecution was not the only arrow in the government’s quiver. These prosecutions 
were accompanied by several changes to the rules governing practice before the 
IRS, new civil penalties, and aggressive investigations of shelter promoters.298 
5. Summary 
Accordingly, the decision to investigate and prosecute tax professionals for their 
roles in marketing abusive tax shelters was consistent with the goals of tax 
enforcement and with the theories underlying criminal liability. The victim, the 
American taxpayer, was compensated. Those that caused the harm were punished. 
Taxpayers could not have dreamed up these transactions or implemented them 
without the professionals. Thus, from both an allocation of blame and a general 
deterrence perspective, pursuing the professionals was the right choice. Finally, the 
change in prosecution policies, along with the other changes in ethical rules and 
conditions placed in the DPAs, helped to restore the integrity of the civil tax 
system. No longer will a professional, or at least a sane one, advise a client to enter 
into a transaction like COBRA, BLIPS, or SOS.299 The fact that some of the most 
high-profile defendants were not convicted does not diminish the appropriateness 
of the decision to prosecute.300 
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B. Tax Havens 
1. Relative Culpability 
The soundness of the decision to prosecute Swiss banks and bankers, while 
largely absolving—at least criminally—the U.S. taxpayers who hid money in these 
banks, is not so clear. This is not, of course, to excuse the conduct of UBS and 
other offshore bankers. UBS admitted that it violated its QI agreement and its own 
express internal policies.301 The actions taken by UBS staff, with the apparent 
complicity of management, were clearly unlawful. UBS used its Swiss bankers to 
recruit high-net-worth individuals in the U.S. in violation of U.S. securities laws, 
and it assisted U.S. taxpayers in setting up accounts at UBS in a manner designed 
to conceal the taxpayers’ ownership or beneficial interest in these accounts.302 It 
failed to issue a Form 1099 for these accounts, in violation of its QI agreement with 
the IRS.303 Thus, the culpability of UBS and its bankers cannot be disputed. And it 
could be argued that UBS got off easy. The $780 million fine was not crippling,304 
and UBS was not, in fact, indicted.305 However, in examining the relative 
culpability of UBS vis-à-vis the U.S. depositor, it is less clear that offshore banks 
and bankers should be held criminally responsible, while U.S. taxpayers largely get 
a pass. Like the tax shelter advisers, the bankers’ misconduct is derivative—it 
occurs only because they helped U.S. taxpayers evade or avoid their obligations 
under the law. However, unlike the tax shelter cases, where clients relied on the 
advice of the tax professionals, those taxpayers who intentionally hid money in 
UBS knew what they were doing was illegal. These wealthy, sophisticated 
taxpayers cannot legitimately claim that they relied on the advice of Swiss bankers 
that they need not report the existence of an offshore account or the income from 
the account.306 There is little gray area in this issue.307 
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Thus, in examining the relative culpability of the actors in this transaction, it is 
difficult to argue that the bankers were more culpable than their U.S. clients.308 
This is particularly so when Swiss law is considered. As discussed above, Swiss 
law makes it a crime for bankers to divulge their customer’s name, the type of bank 
account, the transactions the client entered into, and any information supplied by 
the customer in connection with the account to a foreign government.309 In 
addition, failure to report income or the existence of a bank account is not a crime 
under Swiss law.310 The distinction between “tax fraud,” which is a crime under 
Swiss law, and tax evasion, which is not, was included in the Swiss-U.S. Tax 
Treaty.311 Under the treaty, the Swiss government had no duty to provide bank 
account information under cases of “mere” tax evasion.312 Thus, while the actions 
of UBS violated U.S. law, its actions were consistent with Swiss law and arguably 
not inconsistent with the tax treaty between the United States and Switzerland.313 
In addition, it can be dangerous for prosecutors to wade into the murky waters of 
diplomacy and international relations.314 Indeed, the UBS case caused a backlash in 
Switzerland,315 and many have argued that the conduct of the foreign banks and 
bankers is little different from the conduct of U.S. banks.316 Under U.S. tax laws, 
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interest income on accounts held by nonresident aliens is not taxable.317 U.S. banks 
are therefore not required to, and do not, issue 1099 Forms with respect to these 
accounts.318 Thus, “the United States does not and cannot provide information to 
any of its tax treaty or [Tax Information Exchange Agreement] TIEA partners 
(except Canada) concerning interest paid on deposits by their residents in U.S. bank 
accounts.” 319 As a result, the United States is one of the favorite places of 
foreigners to hide their money.320 In fact, in a letter dated February 9, 2009, the 
Mexican Secretary of Finance, Agustin Carstens, complained to U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner that U.S. banks are being used by Mexican taxpayers, 
including drug dealers, to hide their ill-gotten gains.321 Commentators have listed 
states like Nevada, Delaware, and Wyoming as tax havens,322 and even recent 
proposals to impose “know your customer” duties on U.S. banks have been met 
with opposition.323 More egregious is the HSBC case, in which the U.S. subsidiary 
of the British-based bank failed to maintain adequate anti-money-laundering 
procedures, which allowed hundreds of millions of dollars of narco-profits to be 
laundered through the U.S. banking system.324 Accordingly, while the conduct of 
UBS and others should not be excused, in examining their relative culpability, they 
are no more culpable than their U.S. clients, most of whom were not prosecuted. 
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2. General Deterrence 
While from a relative culpability standpoint the offshore bank prosecutions are 
suspect, it was clearly more practical for the U.S. government to go after a few 
banks and bankers than the tens of thousands of depositors. The government indicts 
less than 3000 defendants for tax crimes per year,325 and it must therefore choose 
wisely the targets it will pursue. As part of its Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
with UBS, UBS agreed to provide bank records on some of its customers.326 The 
government opened a parallel John Doe summons proceeding in an attempt to 
obtain bank account information from a broader population of depositors.327 It also 
indicted a few of the depositors.328 In conjunction with these efforts, the 
government offered a series of offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives.329 Thus, 
depositors were left with the decision of whether to come forward and disclose 
their account information and pay stiff civil penalties or risk criminal 
prosecution.330 This carrot-and-stick strategy encouraged thousands of U.S. 
taxpayers to come forward under the offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives and 
garnered the government more than $4 billion in taxes and penalties.331 Therefore, 
while the decision to pursue UBS criminally can be attacked from a theoretical 
point of view, it is difficult to argue with the strategic choice the government made. 
Hence, like the tax shelter prosecution policy, the government’s tax haven 
strategy has been, and it appears that it will continue to be, quite successful. The 
prosecution policy, along with diplomatic initiatives by the United States and other 
governments, has fundamentally changed the world of offshore banking, at least 
European offshore banking.332 An amendment to the U.S.–Switzerland Tax Treaty 
would broaden the information the Swiss will share in tax cases.333 Numerous other 
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tax information exchange treaties have been signed,334 and Liechtenstein, which 
was once known as the “the most dangerous tax haven in Europe,” 335 has begun to 
ease its bank secrecy rules.336 Thus, from a deterrence perspective, the strategy 
appears to have been at least somewhat successful. That being said, despite the 
number of participants in the offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives, many more 
taxpayers have chosen not to come forward.337 Moreover, even with the increased 
cooperation of Switzerland and Liechtenstein, offshore banks in other jurisdictions 
have rushed to fill the void, and it is therefore unclear whether tax haven abuse 
generally has been reduced.338 Also, it is debatable whether these positive 
developments necessarily flowed from the prosecution policy. Indeed, many 
countries, including Britain and Germany, were able to secure similar benefits 
without resorting to indictments of Swiss bankers.339 
3. Compensating the Victim: The Effect of Tax Haven Abuse on the  
Developing World 
Pursuing UBS and other banks and bankers criminally, while allowing U.S. 
taxpayers to resolve their cases civilly, has brought in more than $4.4 billion dollars 
into the U.S. Treasury.340 These recoveries help to ameliorate the impact of tax 
haven abuses on the U.S. Treasury. Thus, the government can reasonably assert 
that, like the tax shelter initiatives, the victim—the U.S. taxpayer—has been 
compensated, at least to a certain degree. In many respects this position is correct. 
However, the amount recovered is a small fraction of the estimated $100 billion in 
tax revenues that is lost annually due to offshore tax abuses.341 More significantly, 
limiting the “victim” to the U.S. taxpayer is misleading and ignores the true victim 
of tax haven abuse. 
The most profound impact of tax havens and bank secrecy is on the citizens in 
countries of the developing world whose leaders have used haven banks to steal 
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their countries’ wealth. Unlike the use of offshore tax evasion in the developed 
world, where citizens hide assets and income offshore to avoid paying taxes, in the 
case of the developing world, it is the leaders themselves that use bank secrecy 
jurisdictions to hide assets. In some instances, minor kleptocrats accumulate tidy 
fortunes offshore to ensure a comfortable retirement. Other leaders, however, have 
engaged in the systematic plunder of their own countries, accumulating massive 
amounts of wealth in haven countries, leaving their countries and citizens 
impoverished. Ndiva Kofele-Kale has referred to this practice as indigenous 
spoliation,342 which he defines as an “illegal act of depredation committed for 
private ends by constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private 
individuals.”343 As Professor Kofele-Kale notes, the scope of this devastation goes 
beyond mere embezzlement and corruption.344 While corrupt political leaders have 
for millennia taken the wealth from their people, the scope and effect of this new 
form of so-called “grand corruption” is fundamentally different.345 
First, the ability in recent years to move money quickly and efficiently out of the 
country, and then to hide it in a haven jurisdiction, means that the stolen wealth will 
more likely be put offshore, rather than invested in the leader’s country.346 Thus, 
the massive accumulation of assets abroad has the effect of draining resources that 
might otherwise have been used in domestic investment.347 If more of those funds 
stayed in-country, those funds could finance large development budgets.348 The 
international development organization Christian Aid has estimated that if funds 
deposited in tax haven countries were instead retained in the countries and spent on 
areas such as health and education, the lives of poor people in the developing world 
would be transformed.349 For example, if the same proportion of tax revenues were 
spent on healthcare in these countries as has been diverted to tax havens since 
                                                                                                                 
 
 342. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide: The International Economic Crime of 
Indigenous Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 45, 56 (1995). 
 343. Id. (emphasis in original). He has also referred to this conduct as “patrimonicide,” 
which he describes as follows: 
[“Patrimonicide”] comes from combining the Latin words “patrimonium,” 
meaning “[t]he estate or property belonging by ancient right to an institution, 
corporation, or class; especially the ancient estate or endowment of a church or 
religious body,” and “cide,” meaning killing. This term is fitting because 
indigenous spoliation is the destruction of the sum total of a state’s endowment, 
the laying waste of the wealth and resources belonging by right to her citizens, 
and the denial of their heritage. 
Id. at 58 (footnote omitted). 
 344. See id. at 56–59. 
 345. Id. at 58. 
 346. See id. at 58–59. 
 347. Investigation of Philippine Investments in the United States, Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Asian and Pac. Affairs of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong. 263 
(1987) (statement of Rep. Stephen Solarz, Chairman, Subcomm. on Asian and Pac. Affairs). 
 348. Angel Gurría, Improve Tax Fairness and Help the Developing World, ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.oecd.org
/development/improvetaxfairnessandhelpthedevelopingworld.htm. 
 349. See CHRISTIAN AID, supra note 4, at 2. 
554 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:511 
 
2000, then the lives of 350,000 children under the age of five would be saved every 
year.350 
Second, the sheer magnitude of the theft is startling.351 Every year, billions of 
dollars are transferred to havens from the developing world.352 The think tank 
Global Financial Integrity estimates that in 2006, between $858.6 billion and $1.06 
trillion left developing countries in illicit financial outflows.353 The amounts stolen 
have been described as going “beyond shame and almost beyond imagination.”354 
Others have wondered whether the amassing of public wealth has risen “to a point 
of madness or some form of obsessive or compulsive psychiatric disorder.”355 Even 
the lowest estimate suggests that the illegal capital outflow exceeds the net legal 
inflow. The illegal outflow corresponds roughly to ten times the development 
assistance given to developing countries.356 The government of Norway, in its 
comprehensive study of tax havens, noted: 
Potentially the most serious consequences of tax havens are that they 
can contribute to weakening the quality of institutions and the political 
system in developing countries. This is because tax havens encourage 
the self-interest that politicians and bureaucrats in such countries have 
in weakening these institutions. The lack of effective enforcement 
organisations mean that politicians can to a greater extent exploit the 
opportunities which tax havens offer for concealing proceeds from 
economic crime and rent-seeking. These proceeds can be derived from 
corruption and other illegal activities, or be income which politicians 
have dishonestly obtained from development assistance, natural 
resources and the public purse. By making it easier to conceal the 
proceeds of economic crime, tax havens create political incentives to 
demolish rather than build up institutions, and to weaken rather than 
strengthen democratic governance processes.357 
Finally, the hallmark of contemporary indigenous spoliation is the social and 
economic devastation that follows when capital of this magnitude is allowed to 
leave a capital-poor developing country.358 As these funds are put offshore, their 
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countries are required to borrow from foreign lenders, adding to the already 
crushing debt of these countries. The price of these outflows is “billions of dollars-
worth of unsurfaced roads, unpurified water and untreated illnesses.”359 Christian 
Aid has predicted that between 2000 and 2015, 5.6 million young children in the 
developing world will die due to this financial devastation.360 Kofele-Kale points 
out that the impact on the developing world extends beyond those countries’ 
borders in the form of refugees, regional conflicts, and the diversion of foreign aid 
to private coffers.361 Perhaps the greatest irony is that developed countries and 
private charities are subsidizing tax havens by allowing international aid to be 
siphoned off and diverted to tax haven accounts for the benefit of corrupt 
kleptocrats. 
Thus, while the image most connected with tax havens is of sleek yachts in 
Cayman harbors, the impact of haven jurisdictions falls upon the poorest of the 
world’s poor. While the U.S. government should not be faulted for making sure 
U.S. taxpayers are repaid the losses caused by tax havens, compensation of the 
victim cannot stop there. Any solution that developed countries like the United 
States can obtain through their superior bargaining power must take into account 
the effect tax havens have on developing countries. The U.S. government is in the 
process of establishing a network of information exchange agreements 
administered through the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).362 The 
United States is negotiating intergovernmental agreements with countries like 
Japan, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Mexico.363 The information obtained 
via FATCA will be much more timely and robust than the information that can be 
obtained through treaty requests. 
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Including less developed countries in this information exchange would help to 
reduce the impact of tax havens on these countries. Of course, it would be naïve to 
believe that mere information exchange would cure the scourge that tax havens 
impose on the developing world. Indeed, the very nature of indigenous spoliation is 
that those in power, who would receive the exchanged information, are those who 
are hiding money offshore. Nevertheless, given the interrelated nature of the 
banking system and the dangers of not obtaining and supplying this information, 
excluding the developing world from the network of information exchange is not a 
viable option.364 It has been noted that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants.”365 Shining sunlight on tax haven abuses will help cleanse the 
wounds in the developed and the developing world. 
4. Preserving the Integrity of the Tax System 
The criminal cases against Swiss bankers satisfied, at least to a certain extent, 
the Tax Division’s stated goal of preserving the integrity of the civil tax system. 
Offshore banks are less likely to assist U.S. taxpayers in hiding their money, and 
thousands of bank accounts that had been “undeclared” for years have now been 
reported to the IRS. New tax and information exchange treaties have been 
negotiated between many nations. Perhaps more significantly, the debate around 
tax havens has changed.366 Havens are no longer an accepted practice, and 
governments and policy makers are actively seeking new ways to limit the impact 
of havens. And this, as Martha Stewart would say, is a good thing. But more must 
be done. The IRS must continue in its robust civil enforcement of international tax 
avoidance and transfer pricing cases. The government cannot stop with the Swiss 
banks and declare victory. There remains an estimated $21–32 trillion secreted in 
tax haven countries.367 More importantly, the United States and other developed 
countries cannot posture about the evils of bank secrecy and tax haven abuses, 
while tolerating similar practices within their own borders. As discussed above, 
U.S. banks are not required to, and do not, issue tax reporting forms with respect to 
accounts held by nonresident aliens, and the U.S. government does not provide 
bank deposit information to any of its treaty partners.368 Hypocrisy does little to 
boost the integrity of the tax system.369  
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Moreover, the stakes are higher than just the integrity of the U.S. tax system. As 
the facts of the HSBC investigation demonstrate, there are other dangers of bank 
secrecy.370 Tax havens are used not only to evade income taxes and hide assets. 
Bank secrecy allows illegal, as well as legal, income to be hidden, and financial 
anonymity allows drug dealers, organized crime, and terrorism financing to remain 
undetected. In this regard, the Norway Report stated: 
[T]he damaging structures in tax havens not only influence tax 
revenues in other states. These structures are also suitable for 
conducting and concealing a great many forms of criminal activity in 
which it is important to hide the identity of those involved, where the 
crimes are being committed and what they involve. This includes such 
activities as the illegal sale of valuable goods, art, weapons and 
narcotics, human trafficking, terrorism, corruption, theft, fraud and 
other serious economic crimes.371 
Tax havens also contributed to the devastating financial crisis of recent years.372 
Thus, any prosecution policy should focus on obtaining information to combat less 
morally ambiguous crimes—money laundering, terrorism financing, and drug 
trafficking. 
5. Summary 
On balance, prosecuting offshore banks and bankers was the right choice. Like 
the tax shelter prosecutions, the decision to prosecute the professionals was more 
effective than prosecuting the few depositors that the Department of Justice’s 
resources would permit. While the decision to go after the banks was perhaps 
suspect from a theoretical perspective, its deterrent effect cannot be disputed. The 
prosecutorial stick, combined with greater informational exchange and voluntary 
disclosure initiatives, has brought unprecedented cooperation with respect to 
offshore bank accounts. Yet, more must be done. The current prosecution policy has 
made only a small dent in tax haven abuses, and it appears to have done nothing to 
ameliorate the impact of havens on the developing world. The tax- shelter war may 
indeed be over, and if it is, the government certainly won.373 However, the recent 
prosecutions are not the end of the tax-haven war. At best, we can hope that these 
prosecutions represent the “end of the beginning.”374 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The decision to bring a criminal prosecution is one of the most significant 
decisions a government can make. In deciding to employ its limited prosecutorial 
resources against any person, the government must ensure that it is charging only 
clear violations of the law and that prosecution goals will be fulfilled by the 
indictment. Merely because the government can successfully bring a criminal 
prosecution does not necessarily mean that it should. In making decisions whether to 
prosecute or not to prosecute, a determination of guilt by the defendant is not 
sufficient. Only those cases that satisfy all of the stated goals should be advanced. 
Going forward, future investigations and prosecutions should focus more 
explicitly on the purposes for which criminal tax prosecutions are brought: to punish 
wrongdoers (the correct ones), to promote the integrity of the tax system (such as it 
is), and to redress the wrongs inflicted on the victims (all of them). While the tax 
shelter prosecutions satisfied each of these, the tax haven prosecutions did not; this 
was not because the offshore bankers were innocent, but because the prosecutions 
left so many problems unaddressed. Most banks, including U.S. banks, still do not 
provide information about their depositors to other governments. Trillions of dollars 
remain squirreled away offshore, with much of that money coming from the 
countries least able to deal with the outflow of cash. Accordingly, despite the Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation’s belief that there is “newfound 
international determination to contest tax evasion facilitated by a tax haven bank,”375 
it does not appear that there is unanimity that bank transparency is an attainable, or 
even a desirable, goal. Until such unanimity can be reached, criminal prosecutions of 
offshore banks will be suspect. 
That being said, significant progress has been made. The recent prosecutions of 
professionals have introduced—and proven—a powerful new tool for the 
government. Prosecuting professionals magnifies the deterrent effect of these 
prosecutions; shutting down the service providers is more effectual than prosecuting 
the clients. Accordingly, where professionals of any kind facilitate criminal activity, 
focusing on the enablers should be a viable, if not the primary, target. 
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